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ABSTRACT 
 
 The occupational structure of an establishment provides a description of its production 
process by detailing the distribution and relative intensity of tasks performed. In this paper, I 
investigate whether there are substantive differences in the occupational structures of low- and 
high-wage service sector establishments. I show that low-wage establishments organize 
production to use less labor in professional occupations compared to high-wage establishments 
operating in the same local-labor market and industry. In addition, low-wage establishments 
employ fewer individuals in information technology occupations, employ fewer managers, and 
have substantially wider supervisory spans of control. These results indicate that, despite 
operating in the same narrowly defined labor and product markets, low-wage establishments 
organize production to less intensively use labor in skilled occupations. 
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Since the late 1970s, wages for the lowest-earning employees in the United States have 
stagnated, barely increasing until about 2014 (see, for instance, Acemoglu and Autor [2011]). 
This has led to growing interest for the role of public policy in ensuring employed individuals 
earn enough to afford a minimal standard of living, with 34 city and other local areas passing 
local minimum wage ordinances between 2004 and 2014 (Vaghul and Zipperer 2016).  
However, at the establishment level, there is substantial variation in the extent to which a 
given minimum wage increase binds. For instance, in the sample of service sector establishments 
I study in this paper, the bottom 10 percent of establishments pay wages below $8.07 per hour to 
their lowest-paid decile of employees, while the top 10 percent of establishments pay wages 
above $21.14 to their bottom decile. Thus, for local areas considering minimum wages of $15 an 
hour, a large fraction of service sector establishments will find few if any of their employees 
affected by such a minimum wage increase. At the other extreme, 10 percent of establishments 
pay over 90 percent of their employees below $13.15. For this minority of establishments, a $15 
per hour minimum wage would impact nearly all their employees.  
Why are there such differences in the wages establishments pay to their lowest-paid 
workers? I focus on three possible explanations. First, it could be that there are no productivity 
differences between low- and high-wage establishments operating in the same industry and 
geographic market, but high-wage firms choose to share more of the economic rents with their 
employees. Second, it could be that low- and high-wage establishments choose to distribute rents 
within the firm differently. In particular, high-wage firms may have more wage compression, 
leading to a flatter wage hierarchy within the firm. In both cases, low- and high-wage 
establishments should appear otherwise similar except for differences in the wage structure. If 
the only difference between low-wage and high-wage establishments is the wage structure, it is 
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more likely that minimum wage increases will only induce changes in the distribution of rents 
between workers and the employer, rather than inducing firms to change the production process. 
On the other hand, there may be substantive differences in the production process 
between low- and high-wage establishments, leading low-wage establishments to be less 
productive and, accordingly, pay lower wages. In this case, low-wage establishments may have 
less capacity to pay higher wages without reorganizing the production process. Depending on 
whether these differences are due to organizational choices versus permanent heterogeneity in 
productivity between establishments, sufficiently large minimum wage increases will force these 
less-productive establishments to either adapt or exit the market. 
To distinguish between these three explanations for wage heterogeneity, I measure the 
wage and occupational structure of establishments, comparing low- and high-wage 
establishments operating in the same narrowly defined market. By examining the wage structure, 
I can investigate whether establishments that pay low wages to the bottom 10 percent of their 
employees also pay lower wages throughout the hierarchy. To measure heterogeneity in the 
production process, I focus on the occupational structure of establishments. Occupations provide 
a description of the tasks an individual employee performs; thus, the types of occupations an 
establishment employs and the number of employees in each occupation provide a description of 
the production tasks performed in the establishment as a whole.  
I use data from the May 2016 wave of the Occupational Employment Statistics Survey to 
measure heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments. I focus on service sector 
establishments because the service sector is disproportionately low wage (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 2016a). I answer two related research questions. First, I measure how much of variation 
in bottom-decile pay can be explained by fixed characteristics, including industry, geography, 
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and establishment size. After demonstrating that these fixed characteristics can explain at most 
half of the variation in 10th percentile wages, I investigate sources of organizational 
heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments. Focusing on variation within 
narrowly defined industry by geographic area cells, I find that establishments that pay low wages 
to their bottom 10 percent of employees also pay low wages throughout the hierarchy. However, 
these differences in hourly pay are roughly constant throughout the wage hierarchy, leading to 
more within-establishment wage inequality for low-wage establishments. These results are 
inconsistent with the view that low-wage establishments pay low-wages at the bottom in order to 
pay higher wages further up the hierarchy.  
I find substantial variation in occupational structure between low- and high-wage 
establishments. Low-wage establishments employ fewer individuals in professional occupations 
and more individuals in service, clerical, and production occupations. Low-wage establishments 
have fewer managers but more supervisors, leading to a wider span of control throughout the 
hierarchy. Finally, low-wage establishments employ fewer individuals in information technology 
(IT) occupations.  
These results offer important context for understanding low-wage labor markets. The fact 
that almost half of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs within industry by geographic 
cells demonstrates that many establishments can productively pay higher-wages to the bottom of 
their hierarchy. However, the fact that low-wage establishments appear to be organized with a 
very different distribution of occupations indicates that there are substantive differences in how 
low- and high-wage establishments organize their production within the same industry. 
Moreover, the nature of the organizational differences suggests that low-wage establishments 
may in fact be less productive. The fact that low-wage establishments employ fewer professional 
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occupations (which are typically high-skill cognitive occupations), as well as fewer IT 
occupations, indicates that low-wage establishments produce using a less skill-intensive and 
technology-intensive production process. Such results offer suggestive evidence that wage 
heterogeneity between establishments may be due to substantive differences in productivity.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This paper contributes to a growing literature documenting heterogeneity between 
seemingly similar establishments. A variety of papers have documented dispersion in 
characteristics, including total factor productivity (Syverson 2004), management practices 
(Bloom and Van Reenen 2007), and wages (Song, Price, and Bloom 2016). Across this literature, 
it is clear that firms with very different production processes are able to coexist within markets; 
however, there is some evidence that dispersion is narrower when there is more market 
competition (e.g., Syverson 2004). 
There are several factors that have been shown to relate to wage heterogeneity between 
establishments. The firm-size wage premium has been well-established (e.g., Troske 1999). 
Wages may also differ between establishments due to sorting, especially if there are 
complementarities between the firm’s production technology and worker productivity, or 
complementarities between workers (see, for instance, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis [1999]). 
Wage dispersion also appears to relate to persistent productivity differences across 
establishments (Haltiwanger, Lane, and Spletzer 2007). 
This paper presents a new method to measure heterogeneity in the production process, by 
using the occupational structure of the establishment. Several papers examine related measures. 
Maurin and Thesmar (2004) find that the adoption of technology in manufacturing firms is 
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associated with a reduction in the share of employment in production occupations and 
administrative occupations and an increase in the share employed in design and marketing 
occupations. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) find higher productivity for firms that 
adopt IT and organize their workforce in a decentralized fashion. Rajan and Wulf (2006) 
examine the hierarchy for upper-management positions and find that firms have become 
increasingly flat in recent years. This may be associated with decentralization, especially because 
this flattening is associated with greater compensation for these managers who now have a 
broader span of control; however, this flattening also means that top executives have closer 
contact with more of their subordinates. Thus, there is reason to believe that low- and high-wage 
establishments may have different occupation and management structures and that this may be 
related to the adoption of IT.  
In addition, this paper relates to a large literature on the effect of the minimum wage on 
labor markets. A robust subliterature has focused on comparing the effect of minimum wage 
increases on establishments that paid below and above the new minimum wage before the policy 
was enacted (see, for instance, Card and Krueger [1994]; Dube, Naidu, and Reich [2007]). This 
paper can shed light on why we see such heterogeneity within markets in the first place. There is 
little evidence that minimum wage increases lead firms to exit the market (see Belman and 
Wolfson 2015); however, there does appear to be employment spillovers to workers who should 
not have been directly affected by the legislation, suggesting firms may reorganize production in 
response to minimum wage increase (Cengiz et al. 2017; Jardim et al. 2017). This relates to a 
classic literature on labor-labor substitution, which emphasizes how minimum wage policies may 
lead to spillovers in the labor market (e.g., Hamermesh and Grant 1979).  
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METHODOLOGY 
The primary methodological innovation of this paper is to use the occupational structure 
as a measure for the production process of the establishment. The Standard Occupational 
Classification system (SOC) classified occupations primarily based on the work performed in the 
job (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Thus, the distribution of employment across occupational 
categories provides a description of the work performed at the establishment. Although six-digit 
occupational categories provide less information than a job title or a job description, the 
occupational system provides a common categorization across establishments. This allows us to 
compare occupational structure between establishments.  
DATA 
I use data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey, a semiannual 
survey of establishments.1 The OES survey is designed to produce high-quality estimates of 
occupational wages across industries and geography. This survey reaches approximately 200,000 
establishments every six months. I use data from the first wave of 2016, which was collected in 
the second quarter of 2016. The OES is designed to be nationally representative and is a random 
sample stratified by metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area, industry, and establishment size 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016b). The final sample for May 2016 includes 195,691 
establishments, employing over 3.4 million employees. This represents approximately 1.3 
percent of all U.S. employment in May 2016 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016c). 
                                                 
1 Note that establishments are either a firm with a single location or a particular location of a 
multiestablishment firm. Due to the way the data are collected, the basic unit of analysis is the establishment, rather 
than the firm.  
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The OES survey has a unique structure in which each establishment reports the number 
of employees in each cell of a matrix consisting of detailed occupational categories crossed with 
12 wage bins (see Appendix Table A1 for the precise wage intervals). This allows for the 
construction of occupational structure variables, which are unavailable in other major data 
sources in the United States. Nonetheless, the data have several limitations. Crucially, there is no 
worker-level information beyond the employment count within each cell. In addition, the OES 
definition of employment includes all full-time and part-time workers, as well as workers on 
leave, which may skew employment patterns for establishments that rely more heavily on part-
time labor.  
The wages reported in the OES include regular wages, tips, and bonuses, but exclude 
extra pay, such as overtime. The primary wage variable I will focus on is the 10th percentile 
establishment wage, which represents the wage bin in which the 10th percentile employee is 
employed. For establishments of 10 or fewer employees, this is the lowest paid employee. To 
assign a single wage to the range of wages in each wage bin, I use the internal OES-produced 
interpolated average wage for the bin, which is constructed using data from the National 
Compensation Survey. 
I restrict my analysis to service sector establishments, which includes establishments in 
the industries listed in Table 1. This follows the definition used by the Census Quarterly Services 
Survey (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). Since I am interested in the occupational structure within 
establishments, I restrict my analysis to establishments with at least five employees. This cuts the 
sample to 91,673 establishments. In Table 2 I report means, standard deviations, and 10th and 
90th percentiles for key dependent variables.  
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To compare between low- and high-wage establishments, the first step is to define the 
cells within which to compare. I define cells based on six-digit industry code (NAICS) and 712 
commuting zones. I follow Tolbert and Sizer (1996) in defining commuting zones, which consist 
of contiguous aggregates of counties based on historic commuting patterns. For less than 2 
percent of the data, either the county is missing or the establishment is located in an area that is 
not part of the defined commuting zones.2 In this case, I construct a “balance” commuting zone 
for every state or territory. All results are robust to excluding data from these balance commuting 
zones or using metropolitan statistical areas as the geographic area.  
I create three subsamples of the data, the largest of which includes all service sector 
establishments with at least 5 employees and includes 91,673 establishments. The second 
subsample restricts the sample to establishments that are in the same commuting zone by 
industry cell as two other establishments, which reduces the sample to 49,578 establishments. 
The final subsample restricts the sample to establishments in cells of 10 establishments, which 
further reduces the sample to 15,690. These two restricted subsamples allow me to determine if 
an establishment is low- or high-wage within its narrowly defined market. Figure 1 represents 
the distribution of commuting zones that are present in the smallest subsample of data. 
SPECIFICATIONS 
The goal of this paper is to examine the characteristics of heterogeneity in low-wage 
compensation across establishments. The first question is how much of that variation can be 
explained by industry or geography. In Figure 2, I show how 10th percentile establishment wages 
                                                 
2 Commuting zones are defined for the 50 U.S. states. The OES also covers the District of Columbia, 
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
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vary across two-digit industries. Here we see that Utilities have the highest 10th percentile 
wages, on average over $30 per hour, while Accommodation and Food Services have 10th 
percentile wages of under $10 per hour. Similarly, local prices, minimum wage laws, and other 
characteristics of geographic areas mean that wages may vary substantially across commuting 
zones.  
To address this, I run a series of specifications with fixed effects and report the R-squared 
statistic. In particular, I regress  
log⁡(𝑤10)𝑖𝑔 = 𝛼⁡ +⁡𝛾𝑔 ⁡+ ⁡𝜀𝑖𝑔 
where 𝑙og⁡(𝑤10)𝑖𝑐 is the logarithm of the 10th percentile wages for establishment 𝑖 in group 𝑔. 
Group 𝑔 is successively defined as six-digit industry, commuting zones, nine establishment size 
bins, and the interaction of industry by commuting zone. Specifically, I divide establishments 
into the following size categories: 5–9, 10–19, 20–49, 50–74, 75–99, 100–499, 500–749, 750–
1999, and 2000 plus. I report the R-squared and adjusted R-squared, which measures the fraction 
the variation in log 10th percentile wages is reduced by including each set of fixed effects. I run 
this specification on the three samples of the data. Specifications are weighted using the OES 
sampling weights, and standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level.  
 After I establish that a substantial fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs 
within industry by commuting zone cells, I then examine how wage and occupational structures 
differ between low- and high-wage establishments within these industries by commuting zone 
cells. I divide cells by median 10th percentile wages, defining establishments that pay below 
median wages as low-wage and those that pay median or above wages as high-wage. I estimate 
the following linear regression:  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑐 = 𝛼⁡ + ⁡𝛽𝐼𝑖 ⁡+⁡𝛾𝑐 ⁡+ ⁡𝜀𝑖𝑐 
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where 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑐 is a series of dependent variables for establishment 𝑖 in cell⁡𝑐 that is either low-wage 
(𝐼𝑖 = 1) or not. I run the specifications on the 3-establishment cell and 10-establishment cell 
subsamples. Standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level and each specification is 
weighted by OES sampling weights.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
To summarize establishment-level compensation practices and occupational structure, I 
construct a variety of statistics. First, I construct the logarithm of 10th percentile, 25th percentile, 
median, 75th percentile, and 90th percentile wages. I construct wage inequality measures, 
including the ratio of 90th percentile log wages to 10th percentile log wages (90/10), 50th 
percentile log wages to 10th percentile log wages (50/10) and 90th percentile log wages to 50th 
percentile log wages (90/50).  
To summarize the occupational structure of the establishment, I divide all occupations 
into one of four mutually exclusive occupational categories based on the grouping used by 
Acemoglu and Autor (2011). The first category, which I call “professional” occupations, includes 
management, science, legal, education, and health care occupations (SOC codes 11–29). The 
second category, which I call “clerical” occupations, includes office and administrative support 
occupations as well as sales occupations (SOC codes 41–43). The third category, “production” 
occupations, includes construction, installation, production, and transportation occupations (SOC 
codes 45–53). Finally, the fourth category, “service” occupations, includes health care support, 
food preparation, and maintenance occupations (SOC codes 31–39). In order to more directly 
investigate whether high-wage establishments produce using more technology, I turn next to 
computer-related occupations, which are categorized under SOC codes 15.11xx. These include 
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computer analysts, database administrators, computer support specialists, and other related 
occupations. 
To summarize the managerial structure of the organization, I construct three variables. 
First, I use the share of employees that are in the management SOC category. This measure does 
not include supervisors, who are coded in the major occupation with the workers they supervise. 
Thus, I also construct a measure for the supervisor share of establishment employment, as well 
as a measure for the sum of management and supervisors. Finally, I construct several measures 
of span of control. First, I construct the average supervisory span of control, which is defined as 
the total number of nonsupervisory employees divided by the total number of supervisors. In 
addition, I construct a measure of managerial span of control, which is the number of supervisors 
per manager, as well as total span of control, which is the number of nonsupervisory workers per 
the total number of supervisors and managers.  
RESULTS 
In Figure 3 I plot the kernel density of the distribution of the gap between establishments’ 
10th percentile wages and median 10th percentile wages. There is substantial variation in the 
gap. Due to minimum wage laws and OES methodology that collects wages in bins, we see that 
the density is truncated to the left, with the smallest establishment wage falling $2.47 below the 
median. However, to the right we see 10th percentile wages as much as $23.60 per hour above 
median 10th percentile wages.3   
                                                 
3 To preserve data confidentiality, these density plots graph the distribution of percentiles of the underlying 
distribution. Thus, the minimum value is the 1st percentile score and the maximum value is the 99th percentile 
score. 
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Although we see substantial variation across establishments in 10th percentile wages, this 
could be driven by differences in local labor or product markets. For instance, if establishments 
in high-cost-of-living areas pay higher wages, this could mechanically lead to variation in the 
distribution of 10th percentile wages. Similarly, if there is variation between industries in 
staffing, this could drive differences in 10th percentile wages. Thus, in Figure 4, I reproduce the 
plot from Figure 3 (in blue) but add two additional plots. First, I calculate the gap between each 
establishment’s 10th percentile wage and the median 10th percentile wage for the commuting 
zone, plotting the density in red. The gap to commuting zone median smooths out the 
distribution and reduces the truncation on the left, with a largest negative wage gap of $4.64 
below commuting zone median. However, we still see substantial variation in wages, with the 
largest wage gap of $23.71. The overall shape of the distribution is quite similar to the 
nonadjusted data. This suggests that geography is unlikely to be able to explain much of the 
variation in 10th percentile wages.  
Second, I calculate the gap between each establishment’s 10th percentile wage and the 
median 10th percentile wage for the six-digit NAICS industry, plotting the density in green. Here 
we see a bigger change compared to the raw data, with substantially more weight of the density 
close to the zero and less weight in the tails. Nonetheless, we still see extreme values, with the 
smallest wage gap of $8.01 below median industry wage and the largest positive wage gap of 
$21.00. Thus, while we expect industry can account for more of the variation in 10th percentile 
wages across establishments than commuting zones, there still remains substantial unexplained 
variation in wages. 
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VARIATION IN WAGES WITHIN AND BETWEEN CELLS 
Before examining heterogeneity between low- and high-wage establishments, I first more 
formally quantify how much of the variation in 10th percentile wages can be explained by fixed 
characteristics of establishments. In particular, I consider geography (commuting zone), industry 
(six-digit NAICS), and establishment size (nine categories defined above). In addition, I consider 
nonparametrically defined industry by commuting zone cells, which allows for distinct local 
averages for industries in different geographic areas, as well as industry by commuting zone by 
establishment size.  
Table 3 shows the fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages that can be accounted 
for by these fixed effects. Since I am interested in the maximal share of the variation that can be 
attributed to these fixed effects, I report the unadjusted R-squared, which provides a larger 
estimate than the R-squared that has been adjusted for the number of regressors. I include three 
sets of specifications. First, I include all establishments to include the largest sample (91,673 
establishments). However, this leads to many industry by commuting zone cells with only one 
member, leading to an artificially high R-squared statistic. In the second column, I restrict the 
sample to establishments in industry by commuting zones with cells of at least three members, 
which cuts the sample to 49,578 establishments. Finally, in the last column I restrict the sample 
to establishments in cells of at least 10, which leaves a sample of 15,690.  
In the first row, we see that common variation within commuting zones can account for at 
most 7 percent of the variation in 10th percentile wages. In contrast, in the second row we see 
that industries have more explanatory power, accounting for up to 30 percent of the variation. 
This is consistent with the density graphs in Figures 3 and 4, which show a substantial fraction of 
the variation in wages remaining after controlling for industry. In the third row, I investigate the 
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role of establishment size. Although establishment size has been closely linked with wages (see, 
for instance, Troske [1999]), size has little explanatory power in accounting for wages at the 
bottom of the wage distribution, explaining at most 0.4 percent.  
I next turn to nonparametrically defined cells, which are defined as industry by 
commuting zone cells. These cells can account for substantially more of the variation, with as 
much as 60 percent of the variation in 10th percentile wages in the set of all establishments. 
However, many of these cells have only one member, which artificially inflates the unadjusted 
R-squared. If we instead consider the adjusted R-squared, it falls to 26 percent. When I instead 
restrict the data to cells that have at least 3 or 10 members, the gap between the unadjusted and 
adjusted R-squared is reduced. Thus, a conservative estimate is that about half of the variation in 
10th percentile establishment wages can be accounted for by industry and commuting zone cells. 
In Appendix Table A2, I show that industry by geographic cells can account for at most 60 
percent of the variation across a wide variety of wage statistics. 
Finally, for completeness, I include cells defined as industry by commuting zone by 
establishment size bin. These more narrowly defined cells can explain a larger fraction of 10th 
percentile wages than industry and commuting zone alone. However, since more productive 
establishments may be able to grow larger, for my preferred specifications I do not condition on 
establishment size.  
These results indicate that, although there are substantial commonalities in pay within 
industries, a significant fraction of the variation in 10th percentile wages occurs within narrowly 
defined industry by geography cells. This motivates the next section of the paper, in which I 
investigate how the wage and occupational structure differs across low- and high-wage 
establishments within these industry by geography cells. 
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COMPARING ESTABLISHMENTS 
Now that I have established that a substantial fraction of the variation in 10th percentile 
wages remains after controlling for narrowly defined industry by geographic cells, I explore 
other characteristics that are correlated with paying comparatively low or comparatively high 
wages within these narrowly defined cells. What could be driving such heterogeneity? I focus on 
two distinct explanations: differences in compensation practices and differences in productivity.  
Suppose low- and high-wage establishments are equally productive but high-wage 
establishments choose to share a larger fraction of the profits with workers. In this case, we 
should not see any systematic differences in the organizational structure of low- and high-wage 
establishments. This is the ideal scenario for minimum wage legislation, since low-wage 
establishments have enough of a profit margin to be able to afford to raise wages without 
requiring any reorganization or disemployment effects. 
Alternatively, there could be substantive productivity differences between low- and high-
wage establishments. The source of heterogeneity that I focus on in this paper is the occupational 
structure. If high-wage establishments organize production to have more employees performing 
high-skilled tasks or use more technology, this may indicate that low-wage establishments will 
need to reorganize to adapt to minimum wage increases.  
However, there are other sources of productivity differences that I cannot disentangle 
from this data set. For instance, if high-wage establishments pay high wages in order to employ 
more productive employees, or if the higher wages induce more effort via efficiency wages, 
these establishments may be more productive. Each case has opposite implications for minimum 
wage legislation. If high-wage establishments employ the best workers, the scarcity of talent will 
prevent low-wage establishments from emulating high-wage establishments, making it difficult 
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for these low-wage establishments to adapt in response to a high-minimum wage. On the other 
hand, if high wages serve as efficiency wages, any low-wage worker could become more 
productive if given access to higher wages. For instance, if a living wage allows individuals to 
afford stable transportation and child care, this could lead to increased productivity.  
It is worth emphasizing that the analysis rests on the assumption that these establishments 
are operating in the same product and labor markets. I argue that this is reasonable, since six-
digit industry codes are quite specific. For instance, my analysis looks at differences between 
low- and high-wage limited service restaurants in Chicago. Although there may be substantial 
product differentiation, these establishments are producing similar enough products that it is 
reasonable to believe low-wage establishments could emulate the production process of high-
wage establishments, and if low-wage establishments left the market, consumers could be 
expected to substitute to other such establishments.  
HETEROGENEITY IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BETWEEN LOW- AND 
HIGH-WAGE ESTABLISHMENTS 
Next, I compare wage statistics and occupational structure parameters between low- and 
high-wage establishments. As explained in the methodology section, I define low-wage 
establishments as those that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within their industry by 
commuting zone cell. That is, I compare characteristics between low- and high-wage 
establishments that are close substitutes—as close as possible—in the labor and product market.  
Wage Structure of Establishments 
In Table 4, I first examine various wage statistics. In the first row, we see that low-wage 
establishments pay 10th percentile wages that are 0.4 log points less than high-wage 
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establishments, which represents a difference of about 36 percent, or over $4 less per hour. Of 
course, since low-wage establishments are defined as those with below-median 10th percentile 
wages, they will mechanically pay lower 10th percentile wages. More interesting is the 
difference in wages between low- and high-wage establishments for higher-paid workers. At the 
25th percentile wage, low-wage establishments pay about 30 percent less, which falls to 28 
percent less at the 50th percentile wage, 26 percent at the 75th percentile wage, and only 21 
percent less at the 90th percentile wage. Thus, although low-wage establishments pay lower 
wages to workers throughout the establishment hierarchy, the relative gap in wages lessens for 
individuals further up the wage hierarchy.  
This is evident when we examine establishment wage inequality statistics. Here we see 
that the ratio of 90th percentile to 10th percentile log wages is 1.35 for high-wage establishments 
but 1.5 for low-wage establishments. Thus, although low-wage establishments pay lower wages 
throughout the hierarchy, their higher-wage workers are comparatively well paid, leading to 
more unequal wages. For both low- and high-wage establishments, the 90-50 ratio is larger than 
the 50-10 ratio, indicating that inequality is somewhat steeper at the top of the hierarchy 
compared to the bottom.  
These results indicate that establishments do not appear to pay low wages to their bottom 
10 percent of employees because they are transferring rents across workers within the 
establishment. Since even the highest paid individuals are paid less at low-wage establishments, 
it indicates that, if there are no productivity differences between low- and high-wage 
establishments, owners are earning more rents from workers throughout the hierarchy.  
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Occupational Structure of Establishments 
Now that I have shown that there are wage differences between low- and high-wage 
establishments that permeate the whole organizational hierarchy, I turn to measures that can 
capture differences in the production process between low- and high-wage establishments. As 
discussed in the methodology section, I focus on the occupational distribution. Occupations 
provide a description of the tasks performed in the establishment, so examining differences in the 
shares of occupations provides a measure of the heterogeneity in how production is organized.  
In Table 5, I compare occupational structures between low- and high-wage 
establishments. In the first row we see that while professional occupations comprise 32–34 
percent of total employment in high-wage establishments, low-wage establishments employ 13 
percentage points fewer. This represents a 38 percent difference. On the other hand, in all other 
occupational categories, low-wage establishments employ a larger share than high-wage 
establishments. Figure 5 shows these differences. 
Thus, even though these establishments operate in the same local area (commuting zone) 
and produce in the same narrowly defined industry (six-digit NAICS by commuting zone cells), 
establishments that pay low wages to the bottom 10 percent of their employees produce using 
employees who perform a substantially different distribution of tasks, as measured by the 
occupational distribution.  
What can we learn about these low-wage establishments’ production process from the 
fact that they employ approximately 40 percent fewer individuals in professional occupations? 
Professional occupations include a variety of white-collar, cognitive-type occupations. These 
include management, business, and financial occupations, as well as engineers, scientists, skilled 
medical professionals, educators, and legal occupations. These occupations are primarily staffed 
with skilled individuals with specialized education. Thus, if establishments employ fewer 
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professional occupations, it indicates that they are organized to use labor that is lower skilled and 
less trained, suggesting that these establishments may be less productive.4 
In addition, I examine whether low-wage establishments produce using less technology. 
As an indirect measure, I examine computer-related occupations, which are categorized under 
SOC codes 15.11xx. These include computer analysts, database administrators, computer support 
specialists, and other related occupations. If an establishment employs individuals in these 
occupations, it is an indicator that the production process in the establishment utilizes relatively 
more technology. There is evidence that at least in certain circumstances, adoption of IT can 
improve establishment productivity (see, for example, Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007; 
Bresnahan et al. 2002). Nonetheless, since I am focusing on service sector establishments, on 
average I expect the take-up of these occupations to be relatively low. Indeed, in the summary 
statistics we see that, on average, these occupations comprise at most 3 percent of employment in 
establishments in this sector. 
The last rows of Table 5 show that, on average, 3–4 percent of employment in high-wage 
establishments is in computer occupations, depending on the sample. By contrast, low-wage 
establishments are comprised of only 1–2 percent computer occupations on average, an 
approximately 50 percent lower share of computer occupations. Thus, although these 
occupations comprise a relatively small share of total service sector employment, establishments 
that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within industry by commuting zone cells have 
substantially fewer of these IT workers. This suggests that low-wage establishments produce 
using a less technology-intensive production process compared with high-wage establishments.  
                                                 
4 Another possible explanation for the differences in occupational structure is outsourcing. If high-wage 
establishments are high-wage because they have outsourced the low-wage jobs, this could lead these establishments 
to have relatively fewer service, clerical, and production occupations, and relatively more professional and 
management occupations.  
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Management Structure of Establishments 
Now that I have shown that low- and high-wage establishments operate using a 
substantially distinct wage and occupational structures in the same market, I next turn to the 
management structure. There are several reasons why the management structure may vary 
between low- and high-wage establishments. First, if an establishment is more centralized, we 
would expect to see a narrower span of control, since managers are exerting more control over 
their subordinates (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont 1994). If employees sort between 
establishments, we would expect the high-wage establishments in the commuting zone to be able 
to employ higher-ability workers, who in turn are more likely to be able to perform more 
independently. Second, if managers sort between establishments, we would expect high-wage 
establishments to employ higher-skill managers, who in turn can supervise a wider span of 
control (Ortín‐Ángel and Salas‐Fumás 2002). Thus, both theories predict that high-wage 
establishments should have wider span of control. I first investigate differences in establishment 
size between low- and high-wage establishments and then turn to measures of supervisor and 
manager share of employment and measures of span of control. 
In Table 6, I show that the average high-wage establishment has between 33 and 38 
employees, depending on the sample. However, low-wage establishments have 7–10 additional 
employees compared to high-wage establishments, depending on the sample. This means within 
the same industry by commuting zone cell, low-wage service sector establishments are 
approximately 20 percent larger than high-wage establishments. This result is surprising and 
stands in stark contrast to a substantial literature that shows that larger employers tend to pay 
higher wages (Troske 1999). One possible explanation is that low-wage establishments employ a 
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higher share of part-time labor, which would inflate the employment numbers. This result 
warrants further investigation.  
Next, I examine the share of managers and supervisors. I define managers as occupations 
coded in the management two-digit SOC group. Managers are contained within the broader 
group of professional occupations, which we saw were a substantially smaller share of 
employment in low-wage firms compared with high-wage firms. In contrast, supervisors are 
lower-level management positions, and are categorized with the occupation they directly 
supervise; thus, these individuals are contained within the service, clerical, or production 
occupational categories.  
While managers comprise 10 percent of high-wage establishment employment, low-wage 
establishments are only 8 percent managers. This is smaller than the gap we see for professional 
occupations more broadly. On the other hand, when we examine the supervisor share, there are 
only slightly more supervisors in low-wage establishments compared with high-wage 
establishments. 
Next, I examine measures of span of control, which is a way of summarizing the 
management structure of an occupation. It is defined as the number of subordinates per 
managerial worker. We can divide each establishment into a three-level hierarchy. At the bottom 
are all the employees who are neither supervisors nor managers, in the middle are all the 
supervisory workers and at the top are all the managerial workers. Thus, we can define three 
measures of span: 1) the ratio of the bottom level to the sum of the two top levels (supervisors + 
managers), 2) the ratio of the bottom level to the middle level, and 3) the ratio of the middle level 
to the top level.  
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We see that low-wage establishments have wider spans of control across all three 
measures. For both low-wage and high-wage establishments, the span of control is widest for 
supervisors (11–12 for high-wage, 15–16 for low-wage) and substantially lower for supervisors 
to managers (0.8 for high-wage, 1.0 for low-wage). Thus, on average, there are more managers 
than supervisors in high-wage establishments, compared with parity in low-wage establishments. 
However, for both measures, we see that low-wage establishments have span measures that are 
approximately 25–33 percent larger.  
Thus, low-wage establishments are larger but also more bottom heavy, with more 
nonmanagerial workers, slightly more supervisors, and substantially fewer managers. This 
reflects the wider spans of control for managers and supervisors, in which each managerial 
worker is responsible (on average) for overseeing more employees. Despite this wider span of 
control, in Table A3 I show that managers in low-wage establishments are also paid substantially 
less than managers in high-wage establishments.  
In contrast to theories of optimal hierarchy based on managerial talent, supervisors and 
managers in low-wage establishments both supervise wider spans of control and are lower paid. 
In contrast to theories of optimal hierarchy based on decentralization, we see wider spans of 
control at low-wage establishments, which, if individuals sort between establishments, are more 
likely to be staffed by less-skilled individuals.  
One possible explanation for this anomalous result is that low-wage establishments may 
employ a larger share of part-time workers, which cannot be distinguished in the OES data. If 
this is the case, supervisors at low-wage establishments may be able to supervise a larger number 
of subordinates without additional managerial effort or talent. Nonetheless, we also see that there 
are more supervisors per managers at low-wage establishments. If this were due to more part-
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time supervisors, we would expect to see supervisors comprise a substantially larger share of 
employment at low-wage establishments, which is not the case. Thus, while part-time work may 
explain some of the differences in span of control measures between low-wage and high-wage 
establishments, there are likely additional factors at play.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper I have documented that over half of the variation in 10th percentile wages 
occurs within narrowly defined industry and geographic cells. I find that establishments that pay 
below-median 10th percentile wages for the cell pay lower wages to all workers and are more 
unequal. These wage results indicate that establishments that pay low wages to their bottom 
decile are not simply transferring rents between employees.  
Instead, I find evidence that these establishments produce using a substantively different 
production process—namely, employing a smaller share of professional occupation and IT 
occupations. This is suggestive evidence that these low-wage establishments may pay lower 
wages in part because they are less productive overall. If this is true, adapting to increases in the 
minimum wage may require more than simply reducing profits. If it is relatively easy for these 
establishments to mimic high-wage establishments, we may see minimum wage increases spur 
these establishments to modify their production process, potentially increasing their productivity 
overall.  
However, it may be difficult for establishments to modify their productivity. For instance, 
if high-wage establishments are more productive because they employ higher-skill employees, 
scarcity of talent in the labor market will prevent low-wage establishments from simply hiring 
higher-skill employees. In addition, the occupational structure may reflect investment in a 
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particular production process or organizational structure, which may be difficult to change. In 
these cases, we are more likely to see establishment exit in response to minimum wage increases.  
Although there is little evidence that establishments have exited in response to past 
minimum wage increases (Belman and Wolfson 2015), this will depend on the magnitude of the 
minimum wage increase as well as market conditions. Nonetheless, my results suggest that these 
affected establishments are more likely to be selected from the less-productive tail of the 
establishment distribution. Thus, even if minimum wage increases are large enough to induce 
firm exit, such exit is more likely to serve as a mechanism for creative destruction, opening up 
the market for entry or expansion by higher-productivity firms.  
Although this paper is descriptive, several conclusions may be useful for economic 
development policy. First, for local areas considering implementing a local minimum wage 
ordinance, a reasonable target would be a minimum wage that is low enough that some 
establishments within narrowly defined industries (such as limited service restaurants) already 
pay wages above the threshold. This ensures that the wage is sustainable and allows employers to 
have a reasonable opportunity for adjustment. Second, since any minimum wage increase has the 
possibility of causing firms to reorganize or shut down, policymakers should be prepared to offer 
targeted retraining, job search assistance, or other active labor market policies to individuals 
employed in industries that are more likely to be affected. This can help minimize the cost of 
adjustment falling most heavily on the low-wage individuals who were intended to benefit from 
the higher wages.  
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Table 1  List of Service Sector Industries (two-digit NAICS) 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.   
NAICS Industry group 
22 Utilities 
48 Transportation 
49 Warehousing 
51 Information 
52 Finance and Insurance 
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services 
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises 
56 Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services 
61 Educational Services 
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
72 Accommodation and Food Services 
81 Other Services (except Public Administration) 
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Table 2  Summary Statistics 
 
Cell >=10 Cell >=3 All establishments 
 
Mean SD p10 p90 Mean SD p10 p90 Mean SD p10 p90 
10th ptile. wage 13.52 7.81 8.07 21.14 13.11 7.20 8.07 21.14 12.84 6.71 8.07 21.14 
50th ptile. wage 21.10 16.05 8.57 43.27 19.98 14.26 8.54 34.15 19.30 13.08 8.54 34.15 
90th ptile. wage 43.89 38.20 13.15 88.10 40.54 34.90 13.15 88.10 38.59 32.86 13.15 69.01 
Total emp. 39.42 178.05 5.00 69.00 34.32 172.57 5.00 69.00 30.78 151.93 5.00 55.00 
Mgr. share 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.23 
Sup. share 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.15 
Computer share 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.00 
Prof. share 0.32 0.35 0.00 0.88 0.30 0.34 0.00 0.87 0.29 0.34 0.00 0.86 
Service share 0.43 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.41 0.00 1.00 
Clerical share 0.21 0.28 0.00 0.67 0.24 0.29 0.00 0.73 0.25 0.29 0.00 0.75 
Production share 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.31 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.57 
Observations 15,690 49,578 91,673 
Span 7.82 17.43 0.91 16.00 7.37 14.57 1.00 15.25 7.11 13.14 1.00 15.00 
Observations 13,008 40,197 70,871 
Non-sup. to sup.  12.26 21.83 2.60 23.75 11.55 18.65 2.50 23.00 11.08 16.94 2.50 22.00 
Observations 8,612 26,739 46,525 
Sup. to mgrs. 0.83 1.85 0.00 2.00 0.81 1.77 0.00 2.00 0.79 1.72 0.00 2.00 
Observations 10,785 32,778 55,974 
NOTE: Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in the same commuting zone. The span of control 
is the ratio of nonmanagerial employment to managers, while non-sup. to sup. is the ratio of nonmanagerial employment to 
supervisors and sup. to mgrs. is the ratio of supervisors to managers.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.  
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Table 3  R-Squared from Fixed Effect Regressions on 10th Percentile Establishment Wages  
NOTE: Each entry reports the R-squared and adjusted R-square from a separate regression. Specifications include industry, 
commuting zone, and establishment size fixed effects. Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in 
the same commuting zone. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
  
 All establishments Cells >=3 Cells >=10 
Specification: R-sq. Adj-R sq. R-sq. Adj-R sq. R-sq. Adj-R sq. 
Comm. zone FE 0.068 0.060 0.070 0.059 0.068 0.061 
Industry FE 0.265 0.262 0.282 0.278 0.304 0.299 
Est. size FE 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 
Industry × comm. zone FE 0.608 0.260 0.514 0.410 0.421 0.384 
Industry × comm. zone × Est. size FE 0.785 0.153 0.727 0.369 0.609 0.421 
Observations 91,673 49,578 15,690 
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Table 4  Wage Differences between Low- and High-Wage Establishments  
Dependent variable Independent var. Cell >=10 Cell>=3 
10th percentile wages Low-wage est. −0.44*** −0.042*** 
 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Constant 2.59*** 2.56*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
25th percentile wages Low-wage est. −0.35*** −0.034*** 
 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Constant 2.71*** 2.68*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
50th percentile wages Low-wage est. −0.33*** −0.031*** 
 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Constant 2.92*** 2.88*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
75th percentile wages Low-wage est. −0.30*** −0.026*** 
 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
 
Constant 3.18*** 3.13*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
90th percentile wages Low-wage est. −0.24*** −0.22*** 
 
 (0.03) (0.01) 
 
Constant 3.50*** 3.44*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Average wage Low-wage est. −9.48*** −8.29*** 
 
 (0.60) (0.37) 
 Constant 26.08*** 24.27*** 
  (0.10) (0.06) 
90-10 ratio Low-wage est. 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Constant 1.35*** 1.35*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
90-50 ratio Low-wage est. 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Constant 1.20*** 1.20*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
50-10 ratio Low-wage est. 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Constant 1.12*** 1.12*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations  15,690 49,578 
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage 
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at 
the commuting zone level.    
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.  
 32 
Table 5  Occupational Distribution 
Dependent variable Independent var. Cell >=10 Cell>=3 
Professional share Low-wage est. −0.13*** −0.11*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Constant 0.34*** 0.32*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Service share Low-wage est. 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
Constant 0.42*** 0.38*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Clerical share Low-wage est. 0.06*** 0.05*** 
  (0.01) (0.00) 
 Constant 0.20*** 0.23*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Production share Low-wage est. 0.03*** 0.02*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Constant 0.04*** 0.07*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Computer occupations share Low-wage est. −0.02*** −0.02*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
 Constant 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations  15,690 49,578 
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage 
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at 
the commuting zone level. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Table 6  Management Structure 
Dependent variable Independent var. Cell >=10 Cell>=3 
Total employment Low-wage est. 7.11*** 10.08*** 
 
 (2.38) (1.96) 
 
Constant 38.19*** 32.77*** 
 
 0.41 0.3 
 
Observations 15,690 49,578 
Manager share Low-wage est. −0.02*** −0.02*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
 
Constant 0.10*** 0.10*** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Observations 15,690 49,578 
Supervisor share Low-wage est. 0.004 0.005** 
 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Constant 0.05*** 0.05*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) 
 Observations 15,690 49,578 
Span (all nonmanagers to managers) Low-wage est. 3.78*** 3.13*** 
 
 0.56 0.3 
 
Constant 7.20*** 6.89*** 
 
 (0.09) (0.30) 
 
Observations 13,008 40,197 
Sup. span (all nonmanagers to supervisors) Low-wage est. 3.99*** 3.41*** 
 
 0.73 0.44 
 
Constant 11.67*** 11.06*** 
 
 (0.11) (0.06) 
 
Observations 8,612 26,739 
Manager span (supervisors to managers) Low-wage est. 0.19*** 0.25*** 
 
 0.04 0.04 
 
Constant 0.79*** 0.77*** 
 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Observations  10,785 32,778 
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage 
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at 
the commuting zone level. The number of observations changes with specifications, because not all establishments employ 
individuals in management or supervisory occupations.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 1  Commuting Zones in 10-Establishment Cell Sample 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 2  Average 10th Percentile Establishment Wages, by Industry, for 10-Establishment Cell Sample 
 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 3  Kernel Density of Distance between Establishment 10th Percentile Wage and Median 10th 
Percentile Wage for All Establishments 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 4  Kernel Density of Distance between Establishment 10th Percentile Wage and Median 10th 
Percentile Wage, for All Establishments, by Commuting Zone, and by Industry 
 
 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Figure 5  Distribution of Employment across Occupational Categories 
 
 
NOTE: Low-wage establishments indicate establishments that pay below-median 10th percentile wages within industry by 
commuting zone cells, for the 10-cell establishment sample.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A1  May 2016 OES Wage Bins 
 
Hourly wage Annual salary 
Range A Under $9.25 Under $19,240 
Range B $9.25–$11.74 $19,240–$24,439 
Range C $11.75–$14.74 $24,440–$30,679 
Range D $14.75–$18.74 $30,680–$38,999 
Range E $18.75–$23.99 $39,000–$49,919 
Range F $24.00–$30.24 $49,920–$62,919 
Range G $30.25–$38.49 $62,920–$80,079 
Range H $38.50–$48.99 $80,080–$101,919 
Range I $49.00–$61.99 $101,920–$128,959 
Range J $62.00–$78.74 $128,960–$163,799 
Range K $78.75–$99.99 $163,800–$207,999 
Range L $100.00 and over $208,000 and over 
SOURCE:  Bureau of Labor Statistics documentation.  
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Table A2  R-Squared for Additional Dependent Variables 
 
All establishments Cells >=3 Cells >=10 
Dependent variable: R-sq Adj-R-sq R-sq Adj-R-sq R-sq Adj-R-sq 
10th ptile. wage 0.61 0.26 0.51 0.41 0.42 0.38 
25th ptile. wage 0.63 0.30 0.55 0.45 0.47 0.43 
50th ptile. wage 0.66 0.35 0.59 0.50 0.52 0.49 
75th ptile. wage 0.67 0.38 0.60 0.51 0.54 0.51 
90th ptile. wage 0.70 0.44 0.63 0.55 0.60 0.57 
Average wage 0.73 0.49 0.67 0.60 0.63 0.61 
90-10 ratio 0.63 0.30 0.53 0.42 0.47 0.44 
90-50 ratio 0.58 0.21 0.45 0.33 0.37 0.33 
50-10 ratio 0.61 0.27 0.49 0.39 0.42 0.38 
Manager share 0.62 0.29 0.48 0.37 0.39 0.35 
Supervisor share 0.61 0.27 0.45 0.34 0.33 0.29 
Computer occs. share 0.77 0.56 0.73 0.68 0.70 0.69 
Professional share 0.84 0.69 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.77 
Service share 0.91 0.83 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.86 
Clerical share 0.82 0.66 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.68 
Production share 0.87 0.76 0.75 0.69 0.51 0.48 
Total employment 0.31 -0.29 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.09 
Observations 91,673 49,578 15,690 
NOTE: Each entry reports the R-squared and adjusted R-square from a separate regression. All specifications include industry by 
commuting zone fixed effects. Cells are defined by the number of establishments of the same industry in the same commuting 
zone. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
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Table A3 Wages for Subgroups of Occupations 
Dependent variable Independent var. Cells >=10 
10th ptile. mgmt. wages Low-wage est. −0.16*** 
 
 
(0.03) 
 Constant 3.22*** 
 
 
(0.00) 
 Observations 13,008 
10th ptile. non-mgmt. wages Low-wage est. −0.42*** 
 
 
(0.02) 
 Constant 2.58*** 
 
 
(0.00) 
 Observations 10,767 
10th ptile. low-wage occs. Low-wage est. −0.23*** 
 
 
(0.02) 
 Constant 2.51*** 
 
 
(0.00) 
 Observations 13,335 
10th ptile. mid-wage occs. Low-wage est. −0.34*** 
 
 
(0.02) 
 Constant 2.72*** 
 
 
(0.01) 
 Observations 13,335 
10th ptile. high-wage occs. Low-wage est. −0.15*** 
 
 
(0.03) 
 Constant 3.32*** 
 
 
(0.01) 
 Observations 12,095 
NOTE: Each cell reports the coefficients and standard errors from a separate regression with indicators for low-wage 
establishments and industry-by commuting zone fixed effects. Each dependent variable is defined as the 10th percentile wage 
among individuals employed in the occupation of interest within the establishment. Low-wage occupations are defined as the five 
major occupations with lowest median wages (Healthcare support, Food Preparation and Serving Related, Building and Grounds 
Cleaning and Maintenance, Personal Care and Service, Sales and Related, Farming, Fishing, and Forestry), high-wage 
occupations are the five major occupations with the highest median wages (Management, Business and Financial, Computer and 
Math, Architecture and Engineering, Life, Physical, and Social Sciences, and Legal), and mid-wage occupations are the balance. 
All specifications are weighted, and standard errors are clustered at the commuting zone level. The number of observations 
changes with specifications, because not all establishments employ individuals in all occupational categories.  
SOURCE: Author’s calculations. 
 
